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The agency theory of corporate takeovers and restructurings argues that neo-
classical approaches to investment decision making fail to capture the incen-
tive and monitoring problems related to cash flow. In particular, Jensen (1986)
and Griffin (1988) have argued that managers have substantial control over the
allocation of corporate cash flows and incentives to reinvest these flows in
unnecessary or wasteful projects. These uneconomic investments, it is ar-
gued, lead to poor performance and lower valuation. To a crude (ceteris pari-
bus) first approximation therefore, a negative relationship should be observ-
able between the relative extent of "free" cash flow for a firm and the rate of
change in its market valuations.
Unfortunately, empirical testing of this hypothesis is complicated by the
possibility (increasingly recognized in economic theory and long recognized
empirically) that for some firms there may exist a hierarchical ordering to the
costs of different sources of financing (as induced say, by information, tax or
other asymmetries).
1 Typically, internal cash flow would be among the cheap-
est sources that is at the base of this hierarchy. In such circumstances, a firm's
investment may be limited by the availability of internal cash flow. This, in
turn, could limit the growth and general performance of the firm. In short,
internal cash flow can be a source for not only financing permissive manage-
rial extravagances but, in a world of information and tax asymmetries and
other financial market imperfections, can also be a means for a firm achieving
higher growth rates and equity valuations than might otherwise be possible.
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Accordingly, while the agency theory of corporate restructurings is appeal-
ing, empirical verification has proceeded slowly. In particular, empirical test-
ing has focused only on small parts of the model. What is required is an ex-
amination of the relation between cash flows and investment, and then
between those investments and longer-term financial performance. First, do
firms with larger "free" cash flows exhibit different investment behavior? Sec-
ond, do these differences in investment behavior lead to poorer or better finan-
cial performance and, more precisely, under what circumstances?
5.1. A Review of the Agency Model
Agency theory emphasizes the conflicts that arise between management and
stockholders.
2 This approach holds that increased cash flows reduce share-
holder incentives for monitoring performance while increasing managerial
discretion. Managers are believed to take advantage of this discretion by di-
recting cash flows to projects over which they retain supervision. Since this
control cannot be achieved by dividend or share repurchase policies, manag-
ers choose to emphasize capital expenditures. These capital projects are be-
lieved to be uneconomic at the margin in many cases, thereby producing the
consequences of the agency problem.
This argument depends on a number of critical assumptions. For example,
as already noted, if a firm faces a pronounced hierarchy in its financing pos-
sibilities, preference for capital investment may increase value if the set of
investment opportunities is attractive (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988).
However, previous research (Griffin 1988; Jensen 1986) on the agency theory
of restructurings has studied situations in which economic rents on older as-
sets were present and investment opportunities were unattractive. In contrast
to this research, McConnell and Muscarella (1985) found that corporate capi-
tal expenditure announcements are associated with significant positive in-
creases in share values, consistent with a view that managers seek to maxi-
mize the value of the firm when making investment decisions.
3
Similarly, corporate debt that reduces the agency problem by reducing cash
flows available to managers may concomitantly reduce financial capacity,
thereby limiting the firm's ability to undertake positive net present value
(NPV) projects if they present themselves. The agency model implicitly as-
sumes that the costs of managerial discretion in allocating cash flows out-
weigh the benefits of reserve financial capacity.
4 Donaldson (1984) points out
the difficulty in sorting out this trade-off. He finds that managers of large firms
were not oriented toward maximization of the value of the firm, but rather by
"the aggregate purchasing power available to management for strategic pur-
poses during any given planning period."
5 The difficulty, emphasized in
agency theory, is whether this strategic resource flexibility is used to increase
the value of the firm over the longer term.
6
Furthermore, the market for corporate control may fail to serve as a foil for129 A Residual Funds Study of the Paper Industry
reducing managerial cash-flow discretion. Rather than that market acting as a
discipline for cash-rich firms, managers may choose acquisitions as an alter-
native to capital investment projects. For example, if conditions of informa-
tion asymmetry lead managers to know of their excess cash flows before po-
tential acquirers, these cash flows might lead to dubious acquisitions that
enhance or create agency problems, rather than being the solution to them.
7
This relation was found by Bruner (1988) in a study of mergers in which firms
with excess cash and debt capacity were more likely to be bidders for compa-
nies with less liquidity and debt capacity.
5.2 An Alternative Model: The Residual Funds Approach
The agency model is not very precise in its definitions of cash flows and
capital investment, nor does it spell out the decision-making and funds-
allocation processes within the firm. As an alternative, we believe that a resid-
ual funds model better captures the behavioral dimensions of corporate capital
budgeting and related resource allocations. The residual funds approach first
was presented by Meyer and Kuh (1957) and extended by Kuh (1963), Meyer
and Glauber (1964), and Dhrymes and Kurz (1967). More recently, the notion
of a hierarchy of financing choices has been extended to capital structure anal-
ysis by Myers (1984) and to the interaction of investment and financing deci-
sions by Myers and Majluf (1984), Petersen (1988), Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen (1988), Bernstein and Nadiri (1986), and McDonald and Soderstrom
(1986).
The residual funds approach argues that the amount and financing of capital
investment by firms is in part a function of the "residual funds" available after
proceeding down a hierarchy of prior claims on corporate cash flow. The start-
ing point is the total cash flow generated by the firm, which provides the base
amount for distribution to various claimants and investment opportunities.
The first priority is for servicing established levels of debt, incorporating both
interest payments and associated principal obligations (either at maturity or
via sinking funds requirements). The established level of debt will presumably
reflect a firm's evaluation of what constitutes its best mix of debt and equity
financing, trading off tax aspects and other features, and (where applicable)
expected allowance for growth in core lines of business.
The funds available after debt service are then used to pay preferred divi-
dends. The next claimants on the funds, following Dobrovolsky (1951) and
Lintner (1956), and as amplified by more recent signaling concepts (Ross
1977; Bhattacharya 1979; Hakansson 1982; Bernheim 1988; Crockett and
Friend 1988), are the common shareholders, who receive dividends at a pre-
viously established "regular" pattern of payments per share.
8 This pattern in-
cludes established or expected growth in dividends and, for some firms,
where nonrecurring dividends have become a characteristic feature of cyclical
upturns, these "extra" payments as well. Following common dividends, the130 John S. Strong/John R. Meyer
residual funds are then available for capital investment of several types. First,
mandated investments, such as safety needs or pollution control equipment
are put in place. Second, investment aimed at replacing or improving the effi-
ciency of established productive capacity is implemented. Third, new invest-
ments for capacity expansion of established product lines are undertaken, fol-
lowed by capital needed for expansion into closely related products. Finally,
capital investment outside the existing lines of business will be considered,
but generally only if some internal funds remain after meeting prior claims in
the hierarchy.
To see that the residual funds approach can produce outcomes consistent
with those of the agency model of free cash flow, it is useful to consider both
the determinants of capital investment and the dual position of common stock-
holders in the funds-distribution process. To start, capital investment is only
partially a search for positive net present value projects, in which prior invest-
ments are continually reevaluated and potential new investments analyzed in
a neoclassical profitability framework.
9 Rather, when the level of capital in-
vestment is conditioned by the amount of residual cash flows, an important
distinction arises concerning types of capital investment. If we assume that
the baseline financial commitments of debt and dividends were founded on an
extrapolation of current product mix, scale and market trends, and so on, then
capital investment may be classified into two types. First comes sustaining
investment, that amount which is necessary to provide a level of funds com-
mensurate with existing financial and core business requirements. In general,
this should approximate replacement investment, although short-term fluctua-
tions in economic rents and longer-term changes in productivity relationships
may make this correspondence less than one-to-one. Next comes discretion-
ary investment, defined as that which is not required to sustain the firm's core
business at its current level and trend of operations.
Preference for "cheap" internal finance will cause a firm to use residual
funds to pay for sustaining investment whenever possible. By contrast, discre-
tionary investments are more likely to be undertaken when a pool of residual
funds remains available after sustaining investments have been made. In the
event the available funds are absorbed by prior claims, discretionary invest-
ments are less probable, a result consistent with both agency and residual
funds hypotheses. Thus, sustaining investment will tend to be more related to
existing capital stocks and neoclassical profitability approaches, while discre-
tionary capital expenditures will depend on the existence of residual funds.
Resort to external financing also could be described as residually derived,
since it depends on the relationship between internal cash flows, prior finan-
cial claims, and sustaining investment requirements. The cyclical asymmetry
observed by Meyer and Kuh (1957) between accelerator and cash-flow effects
on investment could be similarly explained; the dominance they observed of
the accelerator during cyclical upswings might be expected to correspond with
periods when sustaining investment exceeded the available pool of residual131 A Residual Funds Study of the Paper Industry
funds. In short, discretionary investment serves as a buffer, tending toward
zero when no residual funds are available and competing with nonroutine
shareholder distributions when a surfeit of internal funds exists.
Indeed, if at all possible, all necessary projects will be financed internally.
If, as in many cases, this is not possible, the residual funds will be used as the
basis for establishing the amount of required external financing. Because of
tax considerations (at least in the United States) debt will usually be the
lowest-cost source of external finance and will be used, especially if it can be
accommodated within accepted capital structure targets.
1
0 These targets will
incorporate information on ability to pay debt service from cash flow without
jeopardizing other established claimants, especially prior debt servicing re-
quirements, preferred dividends, and the preexisting pattern of common divi-
dends. New equity becomes attractive only under highly specialized condi-
tions; for example, at very high antidilutive price/earnings ratios or where
additional debt bears a high-risk premium. If, on the other hand, any internal
funds remain after "established" financial and investment claims have been
met, then these funds can be distributed to shareholders, used to replenish
liquidity positions on the balance sheet, or to finance "discretionary" invest-
ment. It is at this point that the agency problem comes to the fore. There are
obviously many "slippages" and possible alternatives, further complicated by
the fact that hierarchical considerations enter on both the financial and real
side. Nevertheless, the residual funds approach will often provide a good ap-
proximation to the real world of corporate capital budgeting. The approach
also helps explain why cash-flow variables consistently do well in empirical
models of investment even though not specified by theories assuming perfect
financial markets.
An interesting issue arises at this point concerning major acquisitions, a
special case of discretionary investment. Here, widespread use of debt finance
and the frequency of postmerger leveraged recapitalizations might seem at
odds with the residual funds model. However, such acquisitions are likely to
change the scale, mix, and trend of the firm's "core business," thus modifying
sustaining investment requirements. At the same time, associated changes in
asset ownership and operations will induce a rethinking of the financial struc-
ture of the combined entity. In particular, major acquisitions are likely to re-
orient firms away from internal growth of core businesses.
1
1 If this occurs, a
reordering of cash flows toward financial claimants is probable. Of course,
restructurings generally include assumption of the prior debt obligations of
the acquired firm, but these claims, along with dividend policies, may be
substantially changed following a restructuring. Thus, the preference for in-
ternal finance in the residual funds model is conditioned by mergers and ac-
quisitions, which introduce changes in the hierarchies of both investment and
financing and require adjustment to a new residual funds regime.
The second principal feature of the residual funds approach is that common
shareholders occupy two places in the hierarchy of funds distribution. The132 John S. Strong/John R. Meyer
two positions correspond to the two sources of return—dividends and capital
appreciation through retention. The dual position of the common stockholder
enhances his monitoring ability, for example, by separating the signals pro-
duced by the regular pattern of dividends from those created by increases in
the dividends, or by the use of external finance. To illustrate, the behavior of
ongoing dividends provides information as to the value of the existing busi-
nesses, while incremental distributions through repurchases or extraordinary
dividends may convey negative information about investment opportunities.
1
2
Under the residual funds approach, changes in the pattern of dividends, and
what such changes signal, are most important; as a corollary, financing con-




Compared with the agency model, the residual funds approach posits a re-
lationship not between total cash flow and investment, but between a quite
restrictive notion of residual cash flow and discretionary investment. Again,
the relevant residual cash flow involves cash available after established debt
service, dividends, and sustaining investments have been made. Empirically,
this means that "free" cash flow in a residual funds model might well be peri-
odically negative even for otherwise very successful enterprises. Indeed, for
the very successful firm participating in a strong growth sector, free cash flow
might be persistently negative. Financial policies that serve to make such cash
flows even more persistently negative by additional debt or dividends, as rec-
ommended by some applications of agency theory, could therefore be ques-
tioned in some circumstances.
5.3 Data
Time-series data from 1971-86 for the paper and allied products industry
are used to test the residual funds approach. The paper industry was selected
for study for several reasons. To start, it experienced two important factor
price shocks, in 1973-74 and in 1979, due to energy prices. Also, the produc-
tion technology of the industry is well defined and relatively homogeneous.
The industry is about average in cyclical sensitivity but has experienced sub-
stantial fluctuations in operating performance over the period studied.
1
4 Over
that study period, the returns to paper industry shareholders have neither con-
sistently outperformed nor lagged behind the stock market as a whole, as
shown in figure 5.1. The range of company total returns encompasses overall
market returns, suggesting that the paper industry provides a better test of the
relationship between cash flows, investment, and performance than industries
in which most firms have performed persistently above (or below) the econ-
omy as a whole.
Compared to the petroleum industry studied by Griffin (1988), the paper
industry has experienced sizable sustaining investment requirements due to
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Fig. 5.1 Total return to shareholders: paper industry and S&P 500
tional capacity investment. Thus, the investment opportunity set may have
shifted from the sustaining class in the 1970s to being more discretionary in
nature in the 1980s. In addition, the cash flows generated by the firms in the
paper industry have not been driven by huge swings in product prices, so that
capital investment in response to nonrecurring economic rents are not so dra-
matic as in petroleum. Finally, the industry has undergone considerable re-
structuring, principally taking the form of industry consolidation of assets,
rather than diversifying mergers or acquisitions. This activity provides an op-
portunity to examine the degree to which those firms with larger residual cash
flows sought to acquire those companies whose cash flows impaired their abil-
ity to make sustaining investments.
Thirty-four firms constitute the data set. Annual balance sheet, income
statement, and funds flow data were obtained from COMPUSTAT tapes,
while monthly financial series were constructed from the COMPUSTAT PDE134 John S. Strong/John R. Meyer
files. While most of the variables are self-explanatory, the investment and
cash-flow series require additional discussion.
Total capital investment was compiled from the funds flow statements for
each firm for each year. The variable was defined as the sum of reported capi-
tal expenditures, acquisitions, and investments (principally securities held for
purposes other than liquidity). Share repurchases were not included. Acquisi-




The separation of capital expenditures into sustaining and discretionary in-
vestment components was done by using accounting data on replacement de-
preciation, with adjustments for real sales growth, as described below. With
the advent of Statement 33 from the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB), current replacement cost data began to be available in the early
1970s. Each firm's quarterly 10-Q report was reviewed for information as to
the age, estimated life and remaining value of its plant and equipment. When
this information was not explicitly provided, Internal Revenue Service guide-
lines on asset class lines and depreciation were used to supplement the com-
pany's quarterly disclosures. The result is a constructed series of "replace-
ment" capital investment for each firm, based on accounting information.
1
6
These amounts were then combined with adjustments to reflect the required
amount of inventory investment. These inventory requirements are not auto-
matically captured by the cost of goods sold on the income statement. Cost of
goods sold and related inventory accounts exhibited wide variations in the
degree of last-in-first-out (LIFO) versus first-in-first-out (FIFO) accounting.
1
7
In addition, adjustments were necessary for those firms that dipped into lower
cost LIFO layers on their income statements during the late 1970s and early
1980s. The inventory adjustments involved the use of current-cost inventory
data when possible and information from the most recent quarterly financial
report on LIFO cost of goods sold and changes in the LIFO reserve. The effect
of these calculations is to reflect more accurately the sustaining expenditures
on physical assets required for ongoing operation at prior or established levels
of activity.
However, such a series does not incorporate those capital investments re-
quired to maintain established growth patterns or trends. To do this, further
adjustments were necessary to distinguish the growth-related component of
sustaining investment from discretionary expenditures. To incorporate this ef-
fect, each firm's real sales growth was calculated, and this growth factor ap-
plied to the required replacement investment calculated above.
1
8 When added
together, the result is an estimate of sustaining investment for each year.
1
9 The
difference between total capital expenditures and sustaining investment pro-
vides our estimate of discretionary investment.
2
0
Residual cash flow was estimated by indirect construction. Reported net
income (before extraordinary items) was combined with noncash expenses
(principally depreciation, amortization, and the change in deferred taxes) to135 A Residual Funds Study of the Paper Industry
generate a total cash-flow measure. Construction of the residual cash-flow
measure began with net operating income before interest and taxes. Consist-
ent with the hierarchical model, interest payments on existing debt and taxes
were then subtracted.
2
1 The subsequent set of cash distributions involve pro-
visions of returns to financial claimants at previously established levels, for
example, net debt issuance, sinking fund requirements, preferred dividends,
and common dividends at the same level as the previous year.
2
2 Following
these distributions, sustaining investment (as described above) was sub-
tracted. The amount of funds available after this entire series of distributions
was defined as the residual cash flow.
5.4 Empirical Tests of Cash Flow-Investment Relationships
Summary statistical information for the paper industry is presented in table
5.1 for the entire 1971-86 period, and the 1971-80 and 1981-86 subperiods.
The 1971-80 subperiod reflects the years of large energy and capital shocks,
while the 1981-86 period covers years of stable or falling energy costs and a
different investment environment. In particular, while capital expenditures as
a percentage of total assets has remained stable, there was more acquisition
Table 5.1 Summary of Cash Flow and Investment Data, Paper Industry
Variable
Return on assets
Residual cash flow as % total cash flow
Residual cash flow as % of common
equity (book value)
Capital expenditures as % of total as-
sets (annual average)
Dividend payout ratio (average)
Debt/asset ratio
Total share repurchases as % beginning
equity
Discretionary investment as % of total
capital investment
Residual cash flow as % of capital ex-
penditures (% internal financing)
Acquisitions and investments as % of
beginning common equity






































































Note: Mean is given for each category with SD in parentheses below.136 John S. Strong/John R. Meyer
activity and less nontakeover discretionary investment in the 1980s. Consist-
ent with the free cash-flow hypothesis and our residual funds model, this de-
cline in nontakeover discretionary investment occurred at the same time as
increases in leverage and dividend payout. Within the possible discretionary
uses of residual funds, the main change has been the importance of share
repurchases, which doubled (on average) between the two periods.
Traditional investment analysis assigns a large role to profitability (net pres-
ent value) as a determinant of investment behavior. A difficulty arises in dis-
tinguishing between the profitability of investment opportunities at the margin
as distinct from the overall profitability of the firm (returns from the flow of
new projects relative to returns from the stock of prior investments). As prox-
ies, our model employs a set of return on assets (ROA) variables and a mea-
sure of Tobin's q, the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement
cost of assets.
2
3 The first of our ROA variables is the firm's ROA for the
previous year, to reflect the "best" historical information that managers might
have on recent performance. The second variable is the ROA that actually
occurred for the current and succeeding year, which is intended to serve as a
proxy for reasonably perfect foresight about investment returns. The third
measure is the overall industry average ROA for the prior year, current year,
and following year. This measure also incorporates foresight, intending to
measure the general industry outlook at the time the investment was made.
While the effect of including both past and future (perfect foresight) ROA
measures might be expected to overstate the strength of the profitability-
investment link, it does provide a more stringent test of incremental influences
of cash flow on sustaining and discretionary investment.
Three alternative cash-flow measures are employed: total cash flows, resid-
ual cash flows, and residual cash flows net of ROA effects. The last of these
measures was constructed by regressing residual cash flows as a percentage of
common equity on the firm's ROA, and defining the regression errors as resid-
ual cash flows net of ROA effects. This measure embodies a rigorous test of
the independent effect of cash flow on investment, since arguably it could be
claimed that ROA or other profit measures incorporate cash-flow financial
considerations.
In pooling the cross section time-series data set, we used both standard
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation with a single intercept and a fixed-
effects model utilizing separate dummy intercepts for each firm. The former
model depends on inter- as well as intrafirm variation, whereas the fixed-
effects model depends solely on interfirm variation. Generally, the fixed-effect
model is preferred because of the asymptotic efficiency of its estimators. The
fixed-effects model has the further advantage of controlling for omitted firm-
specific effects. Consequently, the cash-flow parameter estimates in the fixed-
effects model are more likely to reflect their hypothesized influences rather
than merely serve as a proxy for omitted neoclassical profit-related variables.
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expressed in log transformations. Equations (1), (2), and (3) are OLS esti-
mates for each of the different cash flow measures, while equations (4), (5),
and (6) are the corresponding fixed-effects estimates. Of the profitability mea-
sures, the firm's recent ROA and its expected ROA (in a perfect foresight
framework) are relatively consistent and significant. In addition, industry av-
erage ROA exerts a positive, albeit smaller, effect on sustaining investment.
The q variable is small and insignificant in the OLS equations, but larger and
more significant in the fixed-effects models. The magnitude of the q coeffi-
cients is consistent with the estimates of Salinger (1984), Summers (1981),
Hayashi (1982), and Schaller (1988). The added significance of q in the fixed-
effects regressions suggests that q models should carefully control for firm-
specific effects. This may help to better control for interfirm differences in
market power or other product market imperfections.
The cash-flow variables in table 5.2 are significant and roughly the same
magnitude as the individual profitability variables. However, the profitability
effects taken together are still larger than the cash-flow influences. Also, the
significance of the residual cash-flow variable drops when it is measured net
of ROA collinearity.
The residual funds hypothesis asserts that residual cash flows, while having
some effect on total capital expenditures, should be of greater importance in
determining discretionary investment. In table 5.3, fixed-effects estimates of
discretionary investment equations are shown. The first three regressions in
table 5.3 introduce the three alternate cash-flow measures and are estimated
using the entire pooled sample, including those observaitons where residual
cash flows are negative. However, a "strong form" of the residual funds model
would argue that, since discretionary investment cannot fall below zero, the
residual cash flow-discretionary investment relationship might differ in those
situations where residual cash flows are negative. To evaluate this, equation
(4) of table 5.3 estimates the fixed-effects model without those observations
in which residual cash flows were below zero. Negative residual cash flows
occurred in at least one year for 19 of the 34 firms, but accounted for only
16% of the total observations. As equation (4) shows, the coefficient estimates
are relatively uninfluenced by this change, suggesting that the logarithmic
structure of the model is reasonable.
2
4
The lagged ROA effect is always negative, with marginal significance. Ex-
pected ROA does have the hypothesized positive effect and is somewhat sig-
nificant. Both industry ROA and q effects are insignificant and negatively as-
sociated with discretionary investment. By contrast, the cash-flow estimates
are positive and significant in all equations. Furthermore, residual cash flows
are both larger and more significant than total cash flows as determinants of
discretionary investment. The residual cash-flow measures apparently incor-
porate few profitability effects, as there are only slight differences in the esti-
mated coefficients (and significance) for the "raw" residual cash-flow measure
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Comparing tables 5.2 and 5.3, the profitability variables' coefficients are
larger for sustaining investment than for discretionary expenditures, while the
cash-flow measures are substantially more important for discretionary invest-
ment. In most of the equations, ROA is negatively related to discretionary
investment, yet positively associated with sustaining expenditures. Since the
ROA variables reflect returns on existing assets, they would be expected to
exert a more direct and pronounced influence on sustaining than on discretion-
ary investment. Lower profitability also may signal an orientation toward dis-
cretionary expenditures outside of the firm's current operations.
Table 5.4 presents fixed effects estimates of the determinants of merger and
acquisition activity (within the industry).
2
5 Resources used for within-
industry acquisitions or similar investments can be thought of as a particular
class of discretionary investment. In this case the profitability variables are
negatively related to acquisition activity, although with only marginal signifi-
cance. The major negative relation is with expected ROA, which suggests that
poorer prospects may induce consolidations and outside acquisition activity.
In all three equations, cash-flow measures are significant and positive. More-
over, the residual cash-flow coefficients dominate those for the total cash flows
in magnitude and are roughly equal or better in significance, again supporting
the link between residual cash flow and discretionary investment.
5.5 Residual Cash Flows, Discretionary Investment, and
Financial Performance
The agency model of the market for corporate control contends that free
cash flows create incentives for wasteful capital expenditures, which then hurt
financial performance and reduce the value of firms. The previous sections
found considerable evidence of a link between residual cash flows and the
level of discretionary investment. It remains to be determined whether these
discretionary investments harm financial performance. To analyze this, share-
holder returns must be examined. Since most investments are multiyear in
nature, a long-term review is needed; we chose to measure shareholder returns
as the price relative of common stock for the 1971-80 and the 1981-86 peri-
ods. The price-relative measure cumulates the price and dividend components
of shareholder returns. It is superior to the average total return because it takes
into account wealth positions reinvested on an ongoing basis, rather than only
short-term trading returns.
The results for the 1971-80 and 1981-86 subperiods are presented in table
5.5. Most of the estimated coefficients are similar for both periods; however,
the sustaining investment and dividend payout ratio variables have statistically
significant coefficient changes. Capital expenditure on sustaining investment
was associated with higher returns in the 1970s than in the 1980s. This may
reflect a high marginal return on replacement of existing assets in the wake of
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Table 5.5 Dependent Variable: Price Relative of Common Stock (Total Return
to Shareholders over Entire Period)
Variable 1971-80 1981-86
Constant
Sustaining investment as % of total assets
Discretionary capital investment as % of total assets
Cumulative ROA
Orthogonalized residual cash flow as % of total assets
Dividend payout ratio
Share repurchases as % of equity
Acquisitions and investments as % of common equity
(Sales + inventory change as % of total assets) x




Note: f-statistics are in parentheses.
*p = .01.
ing investment in the 1980s was done in an environment largely characterized
by excess industry capacity, so that maintenance of the existing asset base may
have resulted in lower returns.
In considering the possible influence of sustaining investment on returns,
the interaction of capacity utilization and investment requirements must be
considered. Specifically, the closer a firm is to full capacity, the more likely
growth in sustaining investment will be required. Since firm-specific capacity
utilization measures are not available, a proxy was constructed as (sales +
change in inventories) divided by total assets.
2
6 This variable then was multi-
plied by (sustaining investment/total assets) to create an interactive variable.
The coefficient of this measure is positive and significant in both periods, al-
though much larger in the 1970s. One reason for this change may be that
capacity utilization in the earlier period was much higher; in the 1980s, many
plants did not achieve 80% utilization until late 1985. This result also suggests
that sustaining investment may be quite stable during periods of excess capac-




In both periods, a larger share of discretionary capital expenditure was sig-
nificantly negatively associated with stock price relatives, lending strong cre-
dence to at least the major tenets of the Jensen agency hypothesis. However,143 A Residual Funds Study of the Paper Industry
acquisition activity (a component of discretionary investment) was positively
and significantly associated with higher shareholder gains. At least for the
paper industry, distinguishing between sustaining and discretionary invest-
ment may not go far enough; the positive effects of acquisition activity sug-




The availability of residual cash-flow financing is positively related to
shareholder wealth in both periods, even after orthogonalizing for profitability
effects. One possible explanation is the value of such residual cash flows as
reserve financial capacity, akin to Donaldson's (1984) and Myers and Majluf's
(1984) concept of financial slack. Thus, residual cash flows may provide fi-
nancial flexibility to undertake positive net present value projects if they ap-
pear; however, the negative relation between discretionary investment and
shareholder returns suggests that the key component in the agency model of
corporate control lies not in residual cash flows as much as in the uses to
which those funds are committed.
5.6 Summary
This paper develops two distinctions in evaluating the linkages between
cash flows, investment, and financial performance. The first is the difference
between sustaining and discretionary investment. Sustaining investment is
aimed at maintaining the productive capacity of the firm's existing assets. Dis-
cretionary investment reflects capital expenditures that are not required for
core business purposes, yet are undertaken in lieu of dividend increases, share
repurchases, or other stockholder distributions. A major contention of this
paper is that the determinants of these two types of corporate investment are
quite different. In fact, the logic of the residual funds approach is that it is
inherently a misspecification to use total capital expenditures as a dependent
variable in analysis of investment, since total capital expenditure comprises at
least two different components.
At the same time, a distinction was made between total cash flow and resid-
ual cash flow. The total cash-flow measure is more closely tied to profitability,
while residual cash flows takes into account a hypothesized hierarchy of
claims, only some of which embody legally established priority obligations.
Residual cash flows were defined as funds that remain after debt service,
taxes, sustaining investment, and "established" dividends were paid. This set
of payments to financial claimants, in conjunction with sustaining investment,
is a vital means of signaling information as to the value of the firm's existing
assets. Once this is done, residual cash flows, discretionary investment, and
changes in dividend policies provide information concerning a firm's pros-
pects and investment opportunities.
The disaggregation of investment and cash-flow data is important in empir-
ical analysis of both agency and asymmetric information models. The ob-144 John S. Strong/John R. Meyer
served relationship between residual cash flows, discretionary investment,
and financial performance is consistent with agency hypotheses. Discretion-
ary expenditures are negatively related to shareholder returns, but acquisitions
(mostly related to core business activities) are positively associated with
shareholder wealth. This strongly suggests that further disaggregation and
specification of the different constituent parts of both corporate cash flow and
capital budgets would be worthwhile. Some important nonlinear relationships
also may be present and need to be explored.
2
9 Finally, this paper examined
only one industry; any substantial generalization awaits a broader investiga-
tion into other industries, locales, and time periods.
Of particular interest would be investigations of other industries at different
stages of product maturity and with different cash-flow characteristics. For
example, the behavior of reputedly "mature" industries such as railroads,
steel, and tires might be contrasted with those industries based on relatively
new technologies, such as electronics and some pharmaceuticals. Natural
resource-based industries subject to product price volatility also would pro-
vide a different body of experience for investigation.
In each of these cases, of course, difficult data and definitional problems
are present. However, such problems also are endemic when attempting to
adapt accounting information to measure other economic concepts (as, say,
when attempting to measure q). Furthermore, if the paper industry results are
not too atypical, then efforts to define and measure discretionary investment
and residual funds are valuable, at least by the empirical standard of better
identifying underlying behavioral regularities in investment and financial de-
cisions.
Notes
1. The theoretical base in this area has been developed over a 20-year period in a
series of papers by Joseph Stiglitz (1969, 1973, 1974, 1982, 1988). See also B. Green-
wald, J. Stiglitz, and A. Weiss (1984), J. Stiglitz and A. Weiss (1981), Stephen Ross
(1977), and Hayne Leland and David Pyle (1977). An excellent review of these issues
is found in Auerbach (1983).
2. For a review of these issues, see Amir Barnea, Robert A. Haugen, and Lemma
W. Senbet (1986); also, Michael C. Jensen and Clifford W. Smith, Jr. (1985).
3. However, the study only analyzes stock price effects of the announcement of
capital spending plans, so that the longer-term valuation effects of actual capital ex-
penditures are not considered.
4. Early discussions of debt capacity include John R. Meyer and Edwin Kuh (1957)
and Gordon Donaldson (1961). Recently, Stewart Myers's (1984) notion of "financial
slack" is quite similar.
5. Gordon Donaldson (1984, 3).
6. Much of the empirical work in support of agency perspectives on corporate con-
trol and the problem of managerial discretion relies heavily on stock price event stud-145 A Residual Funds Study of the Paper Industry
ies, which typically cover only a short period, most commmonly 60 days surrounding
the event.
7. Information asymmetry arguments must be carefully drawn in the context of
acquisitions outside of core businesses. In those cases, the acquiring firm's managers
may have no information advantage or, possibly, an information disadvantage. This
may explain (in part) the lack of gains to shareholders of acquiring firms during merger
activity.
8. A review of signaling aspects of alternative financing is presented in P. Asquith
and D. Mullins (1986). See also J. Crockett and I. Friend (1988).
9. K. Smith (1989) finds little evidence of a relation between the sophistication of
investment review and control systems and financial performance.
10. See Alan J. Auerbach (1984).
11. This has been true in the natural resource industries and in financial institutions,
where growth has occurred through acquisition rather than internal expansion. This
reorientation may also account for critiques of such restructurings, which raise con-
cerns about diversion from long-term to short-term goals.
12. In a recent paper, Bernheim shows that dividends and repurchases can serve
different signaling functions analogous to the distinction between sustaining and dis-
cretionary activities. See B. Douglas Bernheim (1988). See also Kose John and Joseph
Williams (1985).
13. This contrasts with Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), who separate firms
on the basis of payout levels in their analysis of investment decisions.
14. The average equity beta for the sample of paper companies is 1.17; the asset-
weighted average beta is 1.04.
15. The discretionary nature of such activities depends in part on the degree to
which acquisitions involve operations related to core business, as distinct from unre-
lated diversification. The COMPUSTAT and DISCLOSURE data only provide aggre-
gate dollar amounts of each firm's acquisitions and investments. A search of the Wall
Street Journal Index and the New York Times Index identified corporate acquisitions
and a few acquisitions of plants or divisions, but for these asset purchases terms typi-
cally were not disclosed.
16. Use of replacement depreciation as a proxy for sustaining investment may over-
state actual sustaining investment, to the extent that such replacement is unwarranted.
This might be true, e.g., in declining industries, or where technological change has
increased the flow of capital services from a given stock of capital assets.
17. This information was gathered from the footnotes of each firm's financial state-
ments for each.year.
18. These adjustments were made using the Consumer Price Index.
19. An alternative measure of sustaining and discretionary investment was con-
structed using a distributed lag model for each company. The model was used to con-
struct a baseline "expected" level of capital expenditures for each firm for each year.
While the two measures of sustaining investment had a correlation of .74, the estimate
of sustaining investment from the distributed lag model is consistently higher than that
employing adjusted accounting data. This result might be expected, since any "aver-
age" level of capital expenditures is likely to include some discretionary component.
20. Although we do present a model of total gross capital expenditures below, our
focus is on the relation between cash flow and discretionary investment, which should
be largely unrelated to capital stock per se. Since our construction is based on replace-
ment depreciation from financial statements, capital stock effects thereby are incorpo-
rated. In the total investment model, Goldfeld-Quandt tests for heteroscedasticity were
rejected. Given reasonably homoscedastic residuals, Kuh and Meyer (1955) argue that
deflating by assets may introduce spurious correlation in the ratios.146 John S. Strong/John R. Meyer
21. This subtraction introduces a degree of measurement error becasuse taxes pay-
able for financial reporting purposes may differ from the actual amount of taxes paid.
22. Net debt issuance is included here as a means by which companies can maintain
target capital structures.
23. In our regressions, our measure of q is unadjusted for taxes and reflects the
market and asset values at the beginning of each year. While a more detailed construc-
tion of q could change our reported results, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) find
little difference in their results using adjusted or unadjusted measures of q. Schaller
(1988), however, finds the estimates of the effects of q on investment to be quite sen-
sitive to measurement issues.
24. The model's fit is enhanced slightly, due to the nonlinearity of discretionary
investment-residual funds relationship around zero.
25. The partitioning of total expenditures into sustaining and discretionary compo-
nents is always open to criticism. However, the clear discretionary nature of acquisi-
tions and investments provides a good test of the residual funds approach.
26. Since the valuation equations are cross-sectional, industry capacity utilization
for each subperiod does not capture intrafirm differences very well. While the (sales
+ inventory change)/total assets measure does suffer from flow-stock incongruity, it
does measure asset-use intensity. To check the relation with capacity utilization, the
constructed (sales + inventory change)/total assets variables were combined into an
asset-weighted average for each year. The correlation of this measure within the time
series of paper industry capacity utilization was .71.
27. Further analysis of this point introduces measurement problems as well, since a
reliance on historically based accounting or investment relations may be unreliable as
a guide to future sustaining investment needs.
28. Given that most of the paper industry merger and acquisition activity involved
consolidation rather than diversification, the positive valuation effects of acquisitions
support well-established business policy views on the value of "sticking to one's knit-
ting" in seeking mergers and acquisitions within the core business or in closely related
activities. SeeM. E. Porter (1987).
29. Dhrymes and Kurz (1967) contend that study of investment and financial poli-
cies generally requires use of simultaneous-equations methodology, given the prevail-
ing endogeneity; they gave particular emphasis to the problem of dividend payout and
retention. This approach, while worthy of exploration, may not apply as directly to the
residual funds model, in that the strict accounting and financial identities are not pre-
sent in our hierarchical model of financial and investment allocation.
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